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Abstract
We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes the
form of the introduction new goods, whose production requires skilled workers.
Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these
new goods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework
highlights a number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine
of growth and a potential barrier to it. As a result, growth in an inverse U-
shaped function of the standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we
characterize the growth and welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We
show how optimal IPR policies a¤ecting the cost of standardization vary with
the skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other
parameters. Third, we show that the interplay between innovation and stan-
dardization may lead to multiple equilibria. Finally, we study the implications
of our model for the skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking
North-South trade to intellectual property rights protection.
JEL classi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Keywords: growth, technology adoption, competition policy, intellectual
property rights.
We thank seminar participants at the SED Annual Meeting (Boston, 2008), Bank of Italy,
the Kiel Institute, CERGE-EI, Univesity of Alicante and the REDg-Dynamic General Equilibrium
Macroeconomics Workshop (Madrid, 2008) for comments. Gino Gancia acknowledges nancial sup-
port from the Barcelona GSE, the Government of Catalonia and the ERC Grant GOPG 240989.
Fabrizio Zilibotti acknowledges nancial support from the ERC Advanced Grant IPCDP-229883.
1 Introduction
The di¤usion of new technologies is often coupled with standardization of product
and process innovations. New technologies, when rst conceived and implemented,
are often complex and require skilled personnel to operate. At this stage, their use
in the economy is limited both by the patents of the innovator and the skills that
these technologies require. Their widespread adoption and use rst necessitates the
tasks involved in these new technologies to become more routine and standardized,
ultimately enabling their cheaper production using lower-cost unskilled labor. How-
ever, such standardization not only expands output but also implies that the rents
accruing to innovators will come to an end. Therefore, the process of standardization
is both an engine of economic growth and a potential discouragement to innovation.
In this paper, we study this interplay between innovation and standardization.
The history of computing illustrates the salient patterns of this interplay. The
use of silicon chips combined with binary operations were the big breakthroughs,
starting the ICT revolution. During the rst 30 years of their existence, computers
could only be used and produced by highly skilled workers. Only a lengthy process
of standardization made computers and silicon chips more widely available and more
systematically integrated into the production processes, to such a degree that today
computers and computer-assisted technologies are used at every stage of production
with workers of very di¤erent skill levels. At the same time that the simplication of
manufacturing processes allowed mass production of electronic devices and low prices,
competition among ICT rms intensied enormously, rst among few industry leaders
and then more broadly at a global scale.
In our model, new products are invented via costly R&D and can rst be pro-
duced only by skilled workers. This innovation process is followed by a costly process
of standardization, whereby the previously new goods are adapted to be produced
using unskilled labor.1 Free entry into standardization makes it a competing process;
standardization will be undertaken by newcomers, which may then displace incum-
bent producers. By shifting some technologies to low-skill workers, standardization
alleviates the pressure on scarce high-skill workers, thereby raising aggregate demand
1This view has a clear antecedent in Nelson and Phelps (1966), which we discuss further below.
See also Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) on the comparative advantage of unskilled workers in
routine, or in our language standardized, tasks. We can also interpret innovation as product
innovation and standardization as process innovation. Evidence that rms engaging in product
innovation (e.g., Cohen and Klepper, 1996) are smaller and more skill intensive than rms engaging
in process innovation is consistent with our assumptions.
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and fostering incentives for further innovation. Yet, the anticipation of standardization
also reduces the potential prots from new products, discouraging innovation. This
implies that while standardization and the technology adoption that it brings is
an engine of economic growth, it can also act as a barrier to growth by potentially
slowing down innovation.
Our baseline framework provides a simple model for the analysis of this interplay.
Under some relatively mild assumptions, we establish the existence of a unique bal-
ance growth path that is saddle-path stable. We show that equilibrium growth is
an inverse U-shaped function of the extent of competitioncaptured by the cost of
standardization. When standardization is very costly, growth is relatively slow be-
cause new products use skilled workers for a long while and this reduces their scale of
production and protability. On the other hand, when standardization is very cheap,
growth is again relatively slow, this time because innovators enjoy ex post prots only
for a short while. This inverse U-shaped relationship between competition and growth
is consistent with the empirical ndings in Aghion et al. (2005), and complements
the theoretical channel highlighted in Aghion et al. (2001, 2005), which is driven by
the interplay of their escape competitionmechanism and the standard e¤ects of
monopoly prots on innovation.
In our model, the laissez-faire equilibrium is ine¢ cient for two reasons. First, as
in many models of endogenous technology, there is an appropriability problem: both
innovating and standardizing rms are able to appropriate only a fraction of the gain
in consumer surplus created by their investment and this makes the growth rate too
low. Second, there is a new form of business stealing e¤ect, whereby the costly
standardization decisions reduce the rents of innovators.2 The possibility that the
laissez-faire equilibrium is ine¢ cient and that growth is maximized by intermediate
levels of competition implies that welfare and growth maximizing policies are not
necessarily those that provide maximal intellectual property rights (IPR) protection
to innovators. Under the assumption that a government can a¤ect markups and
the cost of standardization by regulating IPR protection, we characterize growth
and welfare maximizing combinations of IPR and competition policies. Contrary to
most of the literature, the optimal policy is not the result of a trade-o¤ between the
static cost of monopoly power and dynamic gains. Rather, in our model an excess
2Another form of business stealing, studied extensively in Schumpeterian models of vertical in-
novation (e.g., Aghion and Howitt 1992), is when a monopoly is destroyed by new rms introducing
a better version of an existing products. We suggest that standardization is also an important
source of business stealing.
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of property right protection may harm growth by increasing the overload on skilled
workers, which are in short supply.
When the discount rate is small, we nd that growth and welfare maximizing
IPR policy involves lower protection when R&D costs (for new products) are lower,
when markups for new products are higher and when the ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor supply is greater. The latter comparative static result is a consequence of the
fact that when there is a large supply of unskilled labor, standardization becomes
more protable and thus innovators require greater protection against standardiza-
tion. We also show that when competition policy as well as IPR policy can be used,
the optimal combination of policies involves no limits on monopoly pricing for new
products, increased competition for standardized products and lower IPR protection
than otherwise. Intuitively, lower IPR protection minimizes wasteful entry costs, but
this may lead to excessive standardization and weak incentives to innovate. To max-
imize growth or welfare, this latter e¤ect needs to be counteracted by lower markups
for standardized products. We also show that trade liberalization in less-developed
countries may create negative e¤ects on growth by changing the relative incentives to
innovate and standardize. However, if increased trade openness is coupled by optimal
IPR policy, it always increases welfare and growth.
Finally, we show that under di¤erent parameter congurations or di¤erent assump-
tions on competition between innovators and standardizers, a new type of multiplicity
of equilibria (of balanced growth paths) arises. When too much of the resources of the
economy are devoted to standardization, expected returns from innovation are lower
and this limits innovative activity. Expectation of lower innovation reduces interest
rates and encourages further standardization. Consequently, there exist equilibria
with di¤erent levels (paths) of innovation and standardization. It is noteworthy that
this multiplicity does not rely on technological complementarities (previously studied
and emphasized in the literature), and has much more of the avor of self-fullling
equilibria,whereby the relative prices change in order to support equilibria consistent
with initial expectations.
Our paper is related to several di¤erent literatures. In addition to the endoge-
nous growth and innovation literatures (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992, Grossman
and Helpman, 1991, Romer, 1990, Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos, 1990, Stokey,
1991), there are now several complementary frameworks for the analysis of technol-
ogy adoption. These can be classied into three groups. The rst includes models
based on Nelson and Phelpss (1966) important approach, with slow di¤usion of tech-
nologies across countries (and across rms), often related to the human capital of
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the workers employed by the technology adopting rms. This framework is incor-
porated into di¤erent types of endogenous growth models, for example, in Howitt
(2000), Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006), and Acemoglu (2009, Chapter 18).
Several papers provide more microeconomic foundations for slow di¤usion. These
include, among others, Jovanovic and Lach (1989), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), Jo-
vanovic (2009) and Galor and Tsiddon (1997), which model either the role of learning
or human capital in the di¤usion of technologies. The second group includes pa-
pers emphasizing barriers to technology adoption. Parente and Prescott (1994) is a
well-known example. Acemoglu (2005) discusses the political economy foundations of
why some societies may choose to erect entry barriers against technology adoption.
The nal group includes models in which di¤usion of technology is slowed down or
prevented because of the inappropriateness of technologies invented in one part of
the world to other countries (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001, Atkinson and
Stiglitz, 1969, Basu and Weil, 1998 and David, 1975). Gancia and Zilibotti (2009)
propose a unied framework for studying technology di¤usion in models of endoge-
nous technical change. Our approach emphasizing standardization is di¤erent from,
though complementary to, all three groups of papers.
Our paper is also related to Krugmans (1979) model of North-South trade and
technology di¤usion, whereby the South adopts new products with a delay. Krugman,
in turn, was inspired by Vernons (1966) model of the product cycle and his approach
has been further extended by Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Helpman (1993).3
Our approach di¤ers from all these models because innovation and standardization
make di¤erent use of skilled and unskilled workers and because we focus on a closed
economy general equilibrium setup rather than the interactions between technolog-
ically advanced and backward countries as in these papers. A new implication of
our alternative set of assumptions is that, di¤erently from previous models, growth
is an inverse-U function of standardization. More importantly, none of the above
paper characterizes the optimal IPR policy and how it varies with skill abundance.
Grossman and Lai (2004) and Boldrin and Levine (2005) study the incentives that
governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading economy. Their frame-
work, however, abstracts from the technology adoption choice and from the role of
skill which are central to our analysis.
Finally, our emphasis on the role of skilled workers in the production of new goods
and unskilled workers in the production of standardized goods makes our paper also
3Similar themes are also explored in Bonglioli and Gancia (2008), Antras (2005), Dinopoulos
and Segerstrom (2007, 2009), Lai (1998), Yang and Maskus (2001).
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related to the literature on technological change and wage inequality; see, among
others, Acemoglu (1998, 2003), Aghion, Howitt and Violante (2002), Caselli (1999),
Galor and Moav (2000), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), and Krusell, Ohanian,
Rios-Rull and Violante (2000). The approach in Galor and Moav (2000) is particu-
larly related, since their notion of ability-biased technological change also generates
predictions for wage inequality similar to ours, though the economic mechanism and
other implications are very di¤erent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds a dynamic model of
endogenous growth through innovation and standardization. It provides conditions for
the existence, uniqueness and stability of a dynamic equilibrium with balanced growth
and derives an inverse-U relationship between the competition from standardized
products and growth. Section 3 presents the welfare analysis. After studying the rst
best allocation, it characterizes growth and welfare maximizing IPR and competition
policies as function of parameters. As an application of these results, we discuss how
trade liberalization in less developed countries a¤ects innovation, standardization
and the optimal policies. Section 4 shows how a modied version of the model may
generate multiple equilibria and poverty traps. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Growth through Innovation and Standardization
2.1 Preferences
The economy is populated by innitely-lived households who derive utility from con-
sumption Ct and supply labor inelastically. Households are composed by two types
of agents: high-skill workers, with aggregate supply H, and low-skill workers, with
aggregate supply L. The utility function of the representative household is:
U =
Z 1
0
e t logCtdt;
where  > 0 is the discount rate. The representative household sets a consumption
plan to maximize utility, subject to an intertemporal budget constraint and a No-
Ponzi game condition. The consumption plan satises the standard Euler equation:
_Ct
Ct
= rt   ; (1)
where rt is the interest rate. Time-indexes are henceforth omitted when this causes
no confusion.
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2.2 Technology and Market Structure
Aggregate output, Y , is a CES function dened over a measure A of goods available
in the economy. As in Romer (1990), the measure of goods A captures the level of
technological knowledge that grows endogenously through innovation. However, we
assume that, upon introduction, new goods involve complex technologies that can
only be operated by skilled workers. After a costly process of standardization, the
production process is simplied and the good can then be produced by unskilled
workers too. Despite this change in the production process, good characteristics
remain unaltered so that all varieties contribute to nal output symmetrically. Thus,
Y is dened as:
Y = Z
Z A
0
x
 1

i di
 
 1
= Z
Z AL
0
x
 1

L;i di+
Z AH
0
x
 1

H;i di
 
 1
; (2)
where AH is the measure of hi-tech goods, AL is the measure of low-tech (standard-
ized) goods and A = AH + AL.  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods.
The term Z  A  2 1 is a normalizing factor that ensures that output is linear in tech-
nology and thus makes the nal good production function consistent with balanced
growth (without introducing additional externalities in R&D technology as we will
see below). To see why, note that with this formulation when xi = x, aggregate
productivity, Y= (Ax), is equal to A as in AK models.4
From (2), the relative demand for any two goods i; j 2 A is:
pi
pj
=

xi
xj
 1=
: (3)
We choose Y to be the numeraire, implying that the minimum cost of purchasing
one unit of Y must be equal to one:
1 = A 1

1
A
Z A
0
(pi)
1  di
1=(1 )
: (4)
Each hi-tech good is produced by a monopolist with a technology that requires
one unit of skilled labor per unit of output. Each low-tech good is produced by a
4The canonical endogenous growth models that do not feature the Z term and allow for  6= 2
(e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991) ensure balanced growth by imposing an externality in the
innovation possibilities frontier (R&D technology). Having the externality in the production good
function instead of the R&D technology is no less general and simplies our analysis.
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monopolist with a technology that requires one unit of labor per unit of output. Thus,
the marginal cost is equal to the wage of skilled workers, wH , for hi-tech rms and
the wage of unskilled workers, wL, for low-tech rms. Since high-skill worker can be
employed by both high- and low-tech rms, then wH  wL:
When standardization occurs, there are two potential producers (a high- and a
low-tech one) for the same variety. The competition between these producers is
described by a sequential entry-and-exit game. In stage (i) a low-tech rm can enter
and produce a standardized version of the intermediate variety. Then, in stage (ii),
the incumbent decides whether to exit or ght the entrant. Exit is assumed to be
irreversible, i.e., when a hi-tech rm leaves the market it cannot go back to it and the
low-tech rm becomes a monopolist. If the incumbent does not exit, the two rms
compete à la Bertand (stage (iii)). We assume that all rms entering stage (iii) must
produce (and thus pay the cost of producing) at least  > 0 units of output (without
this assumption, stage (ii) would be vacuous, as incumbents would have a weakly
dominantstrategy of staying in and producing x = 0 in stage (iii)).
Regardless of the behavior of other producers or other prices in this economy, a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game must have the following features: standard-
ization in sector j will be followed by the exit of the high-skill incumbent whenever
wH > wL: If the incumbent did not exit, competition in stage (iii) would result in all
of the market being captured by the low-tech rm due to its cost advantage and the
incumbent would make a loss on the  > 0 units that it is forced to produce. Thus,
as long as the skill premium is positive, rms contemplating standardization can ig-
nore any competition from incumbents. However, if wH < wL incumbents would ght
entrants and can dominate the market. Anticipating this, standardization is not prof-
itable in this case and will not take place. Finally, in the case where wH = wL, there
is a potential multiplicity of equilibria, where the incumbent is indi¤erent between
ghting and exiting. In what follows, we will ignore this multiplicity and adopt the
tie-breaking rule that in this case the incumbent ghts (we modify this assumption
in Section 4). We summarize the main results of this discussion in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 1 In any subgame-perfect equilibrium of the entry-and-exit game de-
scribed above, there is only one active producer in equilibrium. Whenever wH > wL
all hi-tech rms facing the entry of a low-tech competitor exit the market. Whenever
wH  wL hi-tech incumbents would ght entry, and no standardization occurs.
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In the rest of the paper, we focus on the limit economy as  ! 0:5 Since in
equilibrium there is only one active producer, the price of each good will always be a
markup over the marginal cost:
pH =

1  1

 1
wH and pL =

1  1

 1
wL: (5)
Symmetry and labor market clearing pin down the scale of production of each rm:
xL =
L
AL
and xH =
H
AH
; (6)
where recall that H is the number of skilled workers employed by hi-tech rms and
L is the remaining labor force. Markup pricing implies that prots are a constant
fraction of revenues:
H =
pHH
AH
and L =
pLL
AL
: (7)
At this point, it is useful to dene the following variables: n  AH=A and h 
H=L. That is, n is the fraction of hi-tech goods over the total and h is the relative
endowment of skilled workers. Then, using demand (3) and (6), we can solve for
relative prices as:
pH
pL
=

xH
xL
 1=
=

h
1  n
n
 1=
(8)
and
wH
wL
=
pH
pL
=

h
1  n
n
 1=
: (9)
Intuitively, the skill premium wH=wL depends negatively on the relative supply of
skill (h = H=L) and positively on the relative number of hi-tech rms demanding
skilled workers. Note that wH = wL at:
nmin  h
h+ 1
:
For simplicity, we restrict attention to initial states of technology such that n > nmin:
As an implication of Proposition 1, if we start from n > nmin, the equilibrium will
always remain in the interval n 2 nmin; 1. We can therefore restrict attention to
this interval, over which skilled workers never seek employment in low-tech rms.
5The focus on the limit economy is for simplicity. We could alternative model the game di¤erently,
and assume away stage (ii). Although conceptually similar, this case is less tractable.
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Using (7) and (8) yields relative prots:
H
L
=

h
1  n
n
1 1=
: (10)
This equation shows that the relative protability of hi-tech rms, H=L, is increas-
ing in the relative supply of skill, H=L, because of a standard market size e¤ect and
decreasing in the relative number of hi-tech rm, AH=AL. The reason for the latter
e¤ect is that a larger number of rms of a given type implies sti¤er competition for
labor and a lower equilibrium rm scale.
Next, to solve for the level of prots, we rst use symmetry into (4) to obtain:
pH
A
=
"
(1  n)

pL
pH
1 
+ n
#1=( 1)
, and (11)
pL
A
=
"
1  n+ n

pH
pL
1 #1=( 1)
:
Using these together with (8) into (7) yields:
H =
H

"
1 +

1
n
  1
 1

h
1 

# 1
 1
n
2 
 1 , and (12)
L =
L

"
1 +

1
n
  1
  1

h
 1

# 1
 1
(1  n) 2  1 :
Note that, for a given n, prots per rm remain constant. Moreover, the following
lemma formalizes some important properties of the prot functions:
Lemma 1 Assume   2: Then, for n 2 nmin; 1:
@H
@n
< 0 and
@L
@n
> 0: (13)
Moreover, L is a convex function of n.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The condition   2 is su¢ cient though not necessary for the e¤ect of compe-
tition for labor to be strong enough to guarantee that an increase in the number of
hi-tech (low-tech) rms reduces the absolute prot of hi-tech (low-tech) rms. In the
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rest of the paper, we assume that the restriction on  in Lemma 1 is satised.6
2.3 Standardized Goods, Production and Profits
Substituting (6) into (2), the equilibrium level of aggregate output can be expressed
as:
Y = A
h
(1  n) 1 L  1 + n 1H  1
i 
 1
; (14)
showing that output is linear in the overall level of technology, A, and is a constant-
elasticity function of H and L: From (14), we have that
@Y
@n
=
A1 
1
Y
1

  1
"
H
n
  1

 

L
1  n
  1

#
; (15)
which implies that aggregate output is maximized when n= (1  n) = h. Intuitively,
production is maximized when the fraction of hi-tech products is equal to the fraction
of skilled workers in the population, so that xL = xH and prices are equalized across
goods. Equation (14) is important in that it highlights the value of technology di¤u-
sion: by shifting some technologies to low-skill workers, standardization alleviates
the pressure on scarce high-skill workers, thereby raising aggregate demand. It also
shows that the e¤ect of standardization on production, for given A, disappears as
goods become more substitutable (high ). In the limit as !1, there is no gain to
smoothing consumption across goods (xL = xH) so that Y only depends on aggregate
productivity A.
Finally, to better understand the e¤ect of technology di¤usion on innovation,
it is also useful to express prots as a function of Y . Using (2)-(4) to substitute
pH = A
 2
 (Y=xH)
1= into (7), prots of a hi-tech rm can be written as:
H =
(Y=A)1=


H
n
  1

: (16)
A similar expression holds for L. Notice that prots are proportional to aggregate
demand, Y . Thus, as long as faster technology di¤usion (lower n) through standard-
ization raises Y , it also tends to increase prots. On the contrary, an increase in
6An elasticity of substitution between products greater than 2 is consistent with most empirical
evidence in this area. See, for example, Broda and Weinstain (2006).
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n  nmin reduces the instantaneous prot rate of hi-tech rms:
@H
@n
n
H
=
1

@Y
@n
n
Y
    1

< 0: (17)
2.4 Innovation and Standardization
We model both innovation, i.e., the introduction of a new hi-tech good, and standard-
ization, i.e., the process that turns an existing hi-tech product into a low-tech variety,
as costly activities. We follow the lab-equipmentapproach and dene the costs of
these activities in terms of output, Y . In particular, we assume that introducing a
new hi-tech good requires H units of the numeraire, while standardizing an existing
hi-tech good costs L units of Y . We may think of L as capturing the technical
cost of simplifying the production process plus any policy induced costs due to IPR
regulations restricting the access to new technologies.
Next, we dene VH and VL as the net present discounted value of a rm producing
a hi-tech and a low-tech good, respectively. These are given by the discounted value of
the expected prot stream earned by each type of rm and must satisfy the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations:
rVL = L + _VL (18)
rVH = H + _VH  mVH ;
wherem is the arrival rate of standardization, which is endogenous and depends on the
intensity of investment in standardization. These equations say that the instantaneous
prot from running a rm plus any capital gain or losses must be equal to the return
from lending the market value of the rm at the risk-free rate, r. Note that, at a ow
rate m, a hi-tech rm is replaced by a low-tech producer and the value VH is lost.
Free-entry in turn implies that the value of innovation and standardization can
be no greater than their respective costs:
VH  H and VL  L:
If VH < H (VL < L), then the value of innovation (standardization) is lower than
its cost and there will be no investment in that activity.
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2.5 Dynamic Equilibrium
A dynamic equilibrium is a time path for (C; xi; A; n; r; pi) such that monopolists
maximize the discounted value of prots, the evolution of technology is determined
by free entry in innovation and standardization, the time path for prices is consistent
with market clearing and the time path for consumption is consistent with household
maximization. We will now show that a dynamic equilibrium can be represented as a
solution to two di¤erential equations. Let us rst dene:
  C
A
; y  Y
A
; g 
_A
A
:
The rst di¤erential equation is the law of motion of the fraction of hi-tech goods, n.
This is the state variable of the system. Given that hi-tech goods are replaced by a
low-tech goods at the endogenous rate m, the ow of newly standardized products is
_AL = mAH . From this and the denition n = (A  AL)=A we obtain:
_n = (1  n) g  mn: (19)
The second di¤erential equation is the law of motion of . Di¤erentiating  and using
the consumption Euler equation (1) yields:
_

= r     g (20)
Next, to solve for g, we use the aggregate resource constraint. In particular,
consumption is equal to production minus investment in innovation, H _A, and in
standardization, L _AL. Noting that _A=A = g and _AL=A = mn, we can thus write:
 = y   Hg   Lmn
Substituting for g from this equation (i.e., g = (y   Lmn  ) =H) into (19) and
(20) gives the following two equation dynamical system in the (n; ) space:
_

= r     y   Lmn  
H
(21)
_n
n
=

1  n
n

y   
H
 m

1 + (1  n) L
H

; (22)
Note that y is a function of n (see equation (14)). Finally, r and m can be found
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as functions of n from the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. First, note that, if
there is positive imitation (m > 0), then free-entry implies VL = L. Given that L
is constant, VL must be constant too, _VL = 0. Likewise, if there is positive innovation
(g > 0), then _VH = 0. Next, equations (18) can be solved for the interest rate in the
two cases:
r =
L
L
if m > 0 (23)
r =
H
H
 m if g > 0: (24)
We summarize these ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 A dynamic equilibrium is characterized by (i) the autonomous system
of di¤erential equations (21)-(22) in the (n; ) space where
y = y(n) =
h
(1  n) 1 L  1 + n 1H  1
i 
 1
;
r = r (n) = max

L (n)
L
;
H (n)
H
 m

;
m = m (n) =
8><>:
0 if r > L(n)
L
y(n) 
nL
if r > H(n)
H
 m
;
and H (n) and L (n) are given by (12), (ii) a pair of initial conditions, n0 and A0;
and (iii) the transversality condition limt!1
h
exp

  R t
0
rsds
 R At
0
Vidi
i
= 0.
2.6 Balanced Growth Path
A Balanced Growth Path (BGP) is a dynamic equilibrium such that _n = _m = 0 and,
hence, the skill premium and the interest rate are at a steady-state level. An interior
BGP is a BGP where, in addition, m > 0 and g > 0: Equation (19) implies that
an interior BGP must feature mss = g (1  n) =n = (r   ) (1  n) =n. To nd the
associated BGP interest rate, we use the free-entry conditions for standardization and
innovation. Using (12), the following equation determines the interest rate consistent
with m > 0:
rL (n)  L
L
(25)
=
L
L
"
1 +

1
n
  1
  1

h
 1

# 1
 1
(1  n) 2  1 :
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Next, the free-entry condition for hi-tech rms, conditional on the BGP standardiza-
tion rate, determines the interest rate consistent with the BGP:
rssH (n) 
H
H
 mss = nH
H
+ (1  n)  (26)
=
H
H
"
1 +

1
n
  1
 1

h
1 

# 1
 1
n
1
 1 + (1  n) :
The curves rssH (n) and rL (n) can be interpreted as the (instantaneous) return from
innovation (conditional on _n = 0) and standardization, respectively. In the space
(n; r), the BGP value of n can be found as their crossing point: in other words,
along a BGP, both innovation and standardization must be equally protable.7 We
summarize the preceding discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 An interior BGP is a dynamic equilibrium such that n = nss where
nss satises
rL (n
ss) = rssH (n
ss) ; (27)
and rL (nss) and rssH (n
ss) are given by (25) and (26), respectively. Given nss, the
BGP interest rate is rss = L (nss) =L; and the standardization rate is m
ss =
(rss   ) (1  nss) =nss, where L is as in (12) [evaluated at n = nss]. Finally, AH ,
AL, Y and C all grow at the same rate, gss = rss   .
To characterize the set of BGP, we need to study the properties of rL (n) and
rssH (n). Due to the shape of L, rL (n) is increasing and convex. Provided that 
is not too high, rssH (n) is non-monotonic (rst increasing and then decreasing) and
concave in n.8 The intuition for the non monotonicity is as follows. When n is
high, competition for skilled workers among hi-tech rms brings H down and this
lowers the return to innovation. Moreover, when n is higher than h= (h+ 1) aggregate
productivity and Y are low, because skilled workers have too many tasks to perform,
while unskilled workers too little. This tends to reduce H even further. When n
is low, H is high, but the ow rate of standardization is high as well (since, recall,
mss = g (1  n) =n) and this brings down the return to innovation.
Figure 1 shows the BGP relationship between r and n. Note that, as long as
m > 0, the equilibrium must lie on the (dashed) rL (n) curve. An interior BGP must
7It can also be veried straightforwardly that the allocation corresponding to this crossing point
satises the transversality condition.
8A formal argument can be found in the proof of Proposition 4.
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Figure 1: Solid = rssH (n), Dashed = rL (n)
also lie on the (solid) rssH (n) curve. Thus, the interior BGP value of n is identied by
the intersection. The following assumptions guarantee the existence and uniqueness
of a BGP, and that such BGP is interior.
Assumption 1 : 0 <  < H= (H) :
This condition is standard: it guarantees that innovation is su¢ ciently protable
to sustain endogenous growth and that the transversality condition is satised.
Assumption 2 : H < L
h
1+h L=(H+L) :
Assumption 2 ensures that rssH
 
nmin

> rL
 
nmin

; ruling out the uninteresting
case in which standardization is always more protable than innovation when n is
expected to stay constant, and guarantees that the BGP is interior and unique. We
state the existence and uniqueness of the BGP in a formal proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions 1-2 hold. Then there exist a unique BGP equi-
librium.
15
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 establishes the existence and uniqueness of a BGP equilibrium,
denoted by (nss; ss). The next goal is to prove the (local) existence and uniqueness
of a dynamic equilibrium converging to this BGP. Unfortunately, the analysis of
dynamics is complicated by several factors. First, the dynamic system (21)-(22) is
highly nonlinear. Second, it may exhibit discontinuities in the standardization rate
(and thus in the interest rate) along the equilibrium path. Intuitively, at (nss; ss)
there is both innovation and standardization (otherwise we could not have _n = 0). It
is relatively easy to prove that, similar to models of directed change (e.g., Acemoglu
2002 and Acemoglu and Zilibotti 2001), there exists a dynamic equilibrium converging
to the BGP featuring either only innovation (when n < nss) or only standardization
(when n > nss). This implies that when the economy approaches the BGP from
the left, the standardization rate and the interest rate both jump once the BGP is
reached. In particular, when n < nss, there is no standardization, thus, m = 0, while
in BGP we have m > 0. Since throughout there is innovation and thus the value
of hi-tech rms must remain constant at VH = H , there can be no jump in r + m.
Consequently, there must be an exactly o¤setting jump in interest rate r when the
BGP is reached and the standardization rate, m, jumps.9
However, it turns out to be more di¢ cult to prove that there exist no other
dynamic equilibria. In particular, we must rule out the existence of equilibrium
trajectories (solutions to (21)-(22)) converging to (nss; ss) with both innovation and
standardization out of BGP. Numerical analysis suggests that no such trajectory exists
as long as Assumptions 1 and 2 are satised. In particular, the system (21)-(22) under
the condition thatm = H (n) =H L (n) =L (i.e., under the condition that there is
both innovation and standardization) is globally unstable around (nss; ss). However,
we can only prove this analytically under additional conditions. In particular, we must
impose the following parameter restriction:10
  1

(h+ 2) +  >
2h+ 1
h (h+ 1)
: (28)
Proposition 5 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 and (28) hold. Then there ex-
9Note that the discontinuous behavior of the standardization rate and interest does not imply
any jump in the asset values, VH and/or VL: Rather, the rate of change of these asset values may
jump locally.
10This restriction ensures that nmin = h= (1 + h) be not too small, which is key in the proof
strategy (see Appendix). For example, when  = 2, it requires nmin = h= (1 + h) > 0:28 and when
 = 3, nmin = h= (1 + h) > 0:21.
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ists  > 0 such that, for  < ; the interior BGP is locally saddle-path stable. In
particular, if nt0 is in the neighborhood of its BGP value, n
ss, and nt0 > n
ss [resp.,
nt0 < n
ss], then there exists a unique path converging to the BGP such that for some
nite t > t0, we have  2 [t0; t]; m > 0, g = 0 and _n < 0 [resp., m = 0; g > 0
and _n > 0], and the economy attains the BGP at t (i.e., for all   t, we have
n = n
ss, m = mss, and g = gss).
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.7 Growth and Standardization: an Inverse-U Relationship
How does the cost of standardization, L, a¤ect the BGP growth rate, g
ss? Answering
this question is important from both a normative and a positive perspective. First,
policies such as IPR protection are likely to have an impact on the protability of
standardization. Therefore, knowing the relationship between standardization and
growth is a key step for policy evaluation. Second, the di¢ culty to standardize may
vary across technologies and over time.
The cost of standardization a¤ects rL (n), but not rssH (n). Thus, increasing the
cost of standardization amounts to shifting the rL (n) curve in Figure 1 and therefore
the intersection, form n = nmin (low L) to n! 1 (high L). The e¤ect on the growth
rate depends in turn on the relationship between gss and n:
gss (n) = rssH (n)   = n

H (n)
H
  

:
This expression highlights the trade-o¤ between innovation and standardization: a
high standardization rate (and thus a low n) increases the instantaneous prot rate
H (n), but lowers the expected prot duration. Taking the derivative and using (17)
yields:
@gss (n)
@n
=
H (n)
H
  + n
H
@H (n)
@n
=
H (n)
H

1 +
@Y (n)
@n
n
Y (n)

  :
From (15), @Y (n) =@n = 0 at n = nmin. For n > nmin, we have @Y (n) =@n < 0 with
limn!1 @Y (n) =@n =  1. Thus:
@gss (n)
@n

n=nmin
=
H + L
H
2
   and lim
n!1
@gss (n)
@n
=  1:
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Provided that  < H+L
H
2 , gss (n) is an inverse-U function of n. Intuitively, at n = 1
the wage of unskilled workers is zero and hence the marginal value of transferring
technologies to them (in terms of higher aggregate demand and thus also prots)
is innite. Instead, at n = nmin, aggregate output Y is maximized and marginal
changes in n have second order e¤ects on aggregate production. Moreover, given that
future prots are discounted, the impact of prolonging the expected prot stream
(high n) on innovation vanishes if  is high. When  < H+L
H
2 , growth is maximized at
n 2  nmin; 1 that solves:
1   H
H (n)
=  @Y (n
)
@n
n
Y (n)
: (29)
The condition  < H+L
H
2 is satised whenever Assumption 1 (which we imposed above
and which guarantees g > 0) and  < 1 + 1=h, i.e., if skilled workers are su¢ ciently
scarce. It is also satised when  and H are su¢ ciently low. Now recalling that in
BGP n is an increasing function of L, we have the following result (proof in the
text):
Proposition 6 Let gss be the BGP growth rate and assume  < H+L
H
2 . Then, gss is
an inverse U-shaped function of the cost of standardization.
Figure 1 provides a geometric intuition. Starting from a very high L such that
rssH (n) is in its decreasing portion, a decrease in L moves the equilibrium to the left
along the schedule rssH (n) : This yields a lower n
ss and thus higher growth. Therefore,
in this region, a decrease in L increases growth. However, after the maximum of the
rssH (n) schedule is passed, further decreases in L reduce n and growth.
Proposition 6 also has interesting implications for the skill premium. Recall that,
in this model, the skill-premium is the market value of being able to operate new
technologies and produce hi-tech goods. For this reason, it is increasing in the frac-
tion of hi-tech rms (see equation (9)). Since growth is an inverse-U function of n,
the model also predicts a inverse U-shaped relationship between growth and wage
inequality, as shown in Figure 2. Intuitively, a very high skill-premium could be a
sign that standardization is so costly to slow down growth. A very low skill premium,
however, might be a sign of too fast standardization and thus weak incentives to
innovate.
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Figure 2: Growth and the Skill Premium
3 Welfare Analysis and Optimal Policies
We now turn to the normative analysis. We start by characterizing the Pareto optimal
allocation for a given L; representing the technical cost of standardization. This
allows us to identify the ine¢ ciencies that are present in the decentralized equilibrium.
Next, we focus on the constrained e¢ cient allocation that a government could achieve
with a limited set of instruments. In particular, we allow the government to increase
the cost of standardization above L through IPR regulations and to inuence the
level of competition. Finally, we briey discuss how North-South trade a¤ects the
optimal policies.
3.1 Pareto Optimal Allocation
The Pareto optimal allocation is the one chosen by a social planner seeking to max-
imize the utility of the representative agent, subject to the production function (14)
and for given costs of innovation, H , and standardization, L. The current value
Hamiltonian for the problem is:
H = ln (Y   IH   IL) + H
IH
H
+ L
IL
L
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where IH and IL are investment in innovation and standardization, respectively. The
control variables are IH and IL, while the state variables are A and AL; with co-state
variables H and L, respectively. From the rst order conditions, the Pareto optimal
n solves:
@Y
@A
1
H
=
@Y
@AL
1
L
(30)
That is, the planner equates the marginal rate of technical substitution between hi-
tech and low-tech products to their relative development costs. The Euler equation
for the planner is:
_C
C
=
@Y
@A
1
H
  :
By comparing these results to those in the previous section, we can see that the
decentralized equilibrium is ine¢ cient for two reasons.
First, there is a standard appropriability problem whereby rms only appropriate
a fraction of the value of innovation/standardization so that R&D investment is too
low. To isolate this ine¢ ciency, consider the simplest case L = 0, so that there is
no standardization and Y = AH, H = H=. In this case, the social return from
innovation is H while the private return is only r = H= < H. The same form of
appropriability e¤ect also applies when L > 0.
Second, there is too much standardization relative to innovation due to a business
stealing externality: the social value of innovation is permanent while the private
benet is temporary. A particularly simple case to highlight this ine¢ ciency is when
 = 2 so that (30) simplies to:
n
1  n = h

L + H
H
2
;
In the decentralized equilibrium, instead, the condition rL (n) = rssH (n) yields:
n
1  n = h

r
m+ r

L
H
2
Clearly, n is too low in the decentralized economy.
To correct the rst ine¢ ciency, subsidies to innovation (and standardization) are
needed. On the other hand, the business stealing externality can be corrected by
introducing a licensing policy requiring low-tech rms to compensate the losses they
impose on hi-tech rms. In particular, suppose that rms that standardize must
pay a one-time licensing fee licL to the original inventor. In this case, the free-entry
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conditions together with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations (18) become:
VL =
L
r
= licL + L
VH =
H  m
 
VH   licL

r
= H :
Clearly, the business stealing e¤ect is removed when licL = H , that is, when low-tech
rms compensate the hi-tech produces for the entire capital loss H . We summarize
these results in the proposition (proof in the text).11
Proposition 7 The Pareto optimal allocation can be decentralized using a subsidy to
innovation and a license fee imposed on rms standardizing new products.
3.2 Constrained Efficiency: Optimal L
Proposition 7 shows how the Pareto optimal allocation can be decentralized. However,
the subsidies to innovation require lump-sum taxes and in addition, the government
would need to set up and operate a system of licensing fees. In practice, both of
these might be di¢ cult.12 Motivated by this reasoning, we now analyze a constrained
e¢ cient policy, where we limit the instruments of the government. In particular,
we assume that the government can only a¤ect the standardization cost through IPR
regulations restricting the access to new technologies, and ask what would the optimal
policy be in this case.13 More precisely, we nd the (constant) L that maximizes
11Note that there is no static distortion due to monopoly pricing. This is because in our model
all rms only use inelastically supplied factors (skilled and unskilled labor). Thus, markups do not
distort the allocation. In a more general model, subsidies to production would also be needed correct
for the static ine¢ ciency.
12Some reasons emphasized in the literature why licensing may fail include asymmetric information
and bilateral monopoly (e.g., Bessen and Maskin, 2006). See also Chari et al. (2009) on the
di¢ culties of using market signals to determine the value of existing innovations.
13We do not consider patent policies explicitly for a number of reasons. Patents are often perceived
as o¤ering relatively weak protection of IPR, less than lead time and learning-curve advantage in
preventing duplication. Patents disclose information, the application process is often lengthy and
cannot prevent competitors from inventing aroundpatents. Overall, Levin et al. (1987) found that
patents increase imitation costs by 7-15%. This support our approach of modeling IPR protection
as an additional cost.
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BGP utility:
max
L
W = 
1Z
0

ln

C
A

+ ln
 
A0e
gt

e tdt (31)
= ln (ss) +
gss

:
The optimal policy maximizes a weighted sum of the consumption level and its growth
rate. In turn, gss (L) = n [H (n) =H   ] evaluated at the n (L) that solves (27)
and ss = y(n)   g (L) [H + L (1  n)], evaluated at the same n. In general,
problem (31) does not have a closed-form solution. Nonetheless, we can make progress
by considering two polar cases.
3.2.1 Optimal/Growth Maximizing Policy: ! 0
As ! 0, the optimal policy is to maximize gss: For this case, we have simple analytic
results. Manipulating the rst order condition (29), the optimal n is implicitly
dened by: 
1  n
n
h
  1

= 1  1
n

1  1


(32)
Note that the LHS is decreasing in n, from innity to zero, while the RHS is increasing
in n, ranging from minus innity to 1=. Thus, the solution n is always interior and
unique. Using the implicit function theorem yields:
@n
@

n
=
 (1  n)
  1 > 0 and
@n
@h
h
n
= (1  n) (1  + n) > 0 (33)
because, from (32), n    + 1 =  (n) 1 (1  n)  1 h  1 > 0. That is, the optimal
fraction of hi-tech goods is increasing in the relative skill-endowment and in the
elasticity of substitution across products.
Once we have n, we can use the indi¤erence condition between innovation and
standardization, VH
VL
= H
L
, to solve for the L that implements n
. When ! 0 and
m = g (1  n) =n we obtain:
H
L
=
H
L
1
n
!

1  n
n
h
  1

=
H
L
1
n
(34)
The equilibrium fraction of hi-tech goods, n, depends on relative prots (H=L),
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relative R&D costs (H=L), and the standardization risk faced by hi-tech rms
(captured by the factor 1=n). Note that a decline in the relative skill supply, h, leads
to a more than proportional fall in n because H=L falls and m rises. Substituting 
1 n
n h
  1
 from (32) we can nd the optimal standardization cost as:
L = H

n   1 + 1

 1
=
H
1  + n: (35)
This expression has the advantage that it only depends on h through n and can be
used to study the determinants of the optimal policy. Di¤erentiating (35) and using
(33), we obtain the following proposition (proof in the text).
Proposition 8 Consider the case  ! 0. BGP welfare and growth are maximized
when the cost of standardization L satises (35) and n
 is the solution to (32). The
following comparative static results hold:
@L
@H
H
L
= 1
@L
@h
h
L
=  n (1  n) < 0
@L
@

L
=
n  1
  1 > 0:
The results summarized in this proposition are intuitive. Changes in the cost of
innovation should be followed by equal changes in the cost of standardization, so as to
keep the optimal n constant. A decline in the relative supply of skilled workers makes
technology di¤usion relatively more important. However, the incentive to standardize
increases so much (both because of the change in instantaneous prots and because
the equilibrium m increases too) that the optimal policy is to make standardization
more costly. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, a higher abundance of unskilled worker
calls for stronger IPR protection. Finally, given that   2, a lower elasticity of
substitution makes the di¤usion of technologies to low-skill workers more important
for aggregate productivity and reduces the optimal IPR, L.
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3.2.2 Optimal Policy: high 
To understand how the optimal policy changes with the discount rate, we consider
the other polar case. In particular, assume that  ! H+L
H
. As we will see, this is
14To see this, recall that n   + 1 > 0. Then,   2 implies (n   1) = (  1) > 0.
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the highest  compatible with positive growth. In this case, Section 2.7 shows that
g is maximized at the corner nmin = h=(h + 1). Moreover, for n ! nmin we have
H =
L+H

and g = H+L
H
   ! 0 (since  ! H+L
H
). Next, the result that g must
be close to zero yields ss = y; which is also maximized at nmin. Thus, with high
discounting the optimal policy is the same as the one that maximizes static output
(and consumption) only. Reaching this point requires setting L = H : Note that,
in this extreme scenario, the optimal policy becomes independent of h and other
parameters. Comparing the policy L = H to (35) shows, not surprisingly, that high
discounting implies a lower optimal protection of IPR.
3.3 Other Competition Policies
In practice, several other competition policies, besides licensing fees and intellectual
property rights, are used in order to a¤ect the protability of standardization. We
now briey discuss the implications of such policies. Suppose that the government
can directly a¤ect markups in the hi-tech and the low-tech sectors. In particular, it
can set H   and L   in the pricing equations (5).
When markups vary across rms, prots (16) become:
L =
y1=
L

L
1  n
  1

and H =
y1=
H

H
n
  1

(36)
From rL (n) = L=L and the above expressions, it is immediate to see that the
BGP n only depends on the product LL. This result highlights that competition
policy (L) and IPR protection (L) are substitutes. Intuitively, with lower mark-ups
(high L) for low-tech rms, there is less entry in the L-sector. Yet, the government
can o¤set this e¤ect by reducing L, so that it becomes easier to standardize. On the
contrary, gss (n) does not depend on L, so that n is as before. Given that intervening
on L or L is equally e¤ective to implement a desired n
, the optimal mix depends
on the relative costs of the two policies.
Now when we also have ! 0, equation (35) becomes:
L =
H
L
 H
1  + n: (37)
Then, under the assumptions that L can be changed at no cost, it is easy to see that
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the optimal policy is:
H = 
L = 
min
L
L =
H
minL
 H
1  + n
where minL  0 is the minimum technical cost of standardization (i.e., with no
IPR protection). Intuitively, full monopoly among hi-tech rms ensures high innova-
tion; L = Lmin minimizes the resources spent on standardization; high competition
among low-tech rms yields the optimal n. If the desired level of competition L
cannot be achieved, then L should be adjusted upward accordingly.
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3.4 North-South Trade and IPR Policy
We now ask how trade opening in countries with a large supply of unskilled workers
a¤ects the optimal IPR policy. This question is interesting because there is an un-
settled debate on whether trade liberalization in less developed countries should be
accompanied by tighter IPR protection, as implied by the TRIPs Agreement, or by
less strict IPR policies, which serve to encourage technology di¤usion to less advanced
economies. We can investigate this question using our model.
Consider an integrated world economy (the North), described by the model in
Section 2. For simplicity, let us also assume that there is a single large developing
country endowed with unskilled workers only (the South). Without trade, we assume
that Northern technologies are copied at no cost by competitive rms in the South.
However, this form of technology transfer is imperfect: when a low-tech good is
introduced in the South, labor productivity there is only a fraction ' 2 (0; 1]. There
is no innovation in the South.
Now imagine that the South opens its economy to trade. We assume that economic
integration allows Northern rms to produce in the South. In the new integrated equi-
librium factor prices are equalized (or else rms would relocate to the country where
15Another way to highlight the same result is that policy does not a¤ect markups, but rather
patent duration in the low-tech sector. In the model considered so far, patent length is innite in
the low-tech sector. Suppose, however, that patent duration is nite and, once the patent expires,
the good is produced by unskilled workers under competitive conditions. Here, the key trade-o¤
is between the cost of standardization and the duration of the subsequent monopoly position in
the low-tech sector. The gist of the argument is that the best combination is, in a sense, low
IPR everywhere (low L and short patents). However, it has to be carefully tailored, since the
cost-relative-to-duration must be pinned down so as to get the right n.
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labor is cheaper) and Southern rms are replaced by their Northern counterpart. This
result stems from the fact that Northern rms are more productive and can capture
the entire market by charging a price equal to or lower than the marginal cost of
the Southern imitators, pL  wL='. However, if ' > (1  1=), Northern rms must
compress their markup to keep Southern imitators out.
In sum, the e¤ect of trade opening in the South is isomorphic to an increase
in the world endowment of L and possibly a reduction in the markup and prot
margins of low-tech rms (higher L). What are the implications for the BGP growth
rate and the optimal IPR policy? The change in L and L have opposite e¤ects on
L (see equation (36)) and hence on the return from standardization, so the rL (n)
curve in Figure 1 may either shift up or down. The rssH (n) curve, instead, always
shifts up because the greater supply of low-tech goods increases the price and thus
the protability of hi-tech products. As a result, in the new BGP, nss and gss may
be higher or lower. Despite this ambiguity, it is easy to see that trade opening is
necessarily growth (and welfare) enhancing if IPR policy, L, is correctly adjusted.
This follows immediately from the upward shift of the rssH (n) curve, implying that
the maximum attainable r must be higher.
The crucial question, then, is how L should be changed. As already seen, a higher
L=H increases the optimal level of IPR protection, L. On the other hand, higher
competition among low-tech rms, L, calls for a reduction in L, to compensate for
the fall in prot margins (see equation (37)). The net e¤ect depends on which force
dominates. If the liberalizing country is large and ine¢ cient (low '), the competitive
pressure posed by imitators on low-tech rms is weak, while the threat to hi-tech
rms, due to the increased incentives to standardize, is high. In this case, integration
should be followed by a tightening of IPR policies.16
4 Extension: Multiple Equilibria and Poverty Traps
We have so far assumed that, at wH = wL, standardization stops implying that in
a BGP n stays in the range (nmin; 1). This is an immediate consequence of the as-
sumption that, at wH = wL, incumbent hi-tech rms ght (see Proposition 1) so that
low-tech rms do not nd entry protable. Under this assumption and Assumption
2, Proposition 4 established the uniqueness of a BGP equilibrium. However, either
16These are the policies that a world planner would choose starting from the optimum. Yet,
governments of individual countries face di¤erent incentives, because an increase in L leads to a
higher skill premium and redistributes income towards skill-abundant countries. This conict of
interests between the North and the South is studied, among others, by Grossman and Lai (2004).
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when we adopt the alternative tie-breaking rule whereby at wH = wL hi-tech rms
facing the entry of a low-tech competitor exit or relax Assumption 2, the model may
generate multiple equilibria and potential poverty traps. In this section, we briey
discuss this possibility.
For brevity, we focus on the case where Assumption 2 still holds but the competi-
tion between hi-tech rms and entrants at wH = wL is resolved according to the polar
opposite tie-breaking rule. Even under this alternative tie-breaking rule, we still have
that wH  wL for any n 2 [0; 1] since skilled worker can always take unskilled jobs.
But in contrast to Proposition 1 now standardization may continue even at n < nmin.
As a rst step in the analysis of this case, we characterize the static equilibrium
for low levels of n. Recall that wH = wL at n = nmin. For n < nmin, the skill premium
is constant at wH = wL and some high skill workers are employed in low-tech rms.
In this case, the allocation of labor between the two type of rms, h, is determined
endogenously by equation (9) after setting wH = wL. This yields h = n=(1  n) and
a prot rate of H = L = L+H . In other words, for su¢ ciently low n, it is as if
workers were perfect substitutes, prices are equalized pH = pL, and so are prots.
To nd the steady states, we draw the rL (n) and rssH (n) schedules over the entire
domain n 2 [0; 1]. Figure 3 shows the determination of nss for two possible rL (n)
schedules, corresponding to di¤erent values of L. Compared to Figure 1, the rst
part of both schedules is a straight line, as there the skill premium is constant and
equal to one. The interior BGPs are again the intersections between the rssH (n) (solid
line) and rL (n) (dashed line) schedules.
In addition to balanced growth equilibria, now there might exist corner steady-
states such that n = g = m = 0 and r = . A corner steady state can arise in
two di¤erent circumstances: (i) at n = 0, there is no incentive to innovate nor to
standardize, i.e.,  > L
L
= H+L
L
and  > H
H
= H+L
H
; (ii) at n = 0, rms have an
incentive to standardize, i.e.,  < H+L
L
; but there are no goods to standardize, since
n = 0. Moreover, innovation is discouraged by the expectation that new hi-tech
goods would trigger a high standardization rate. Formally, innovating rms expect
that m > H+L
H
   whenever n > 0. This conjecture does not violate the resource
constraint since the absolute investment in standardization would be innitesimal
when n = 0 even though the standardization rate were high. The uninteresting case
in which rL (n) lays above rssH (n) for all n is still ruled out by Assumption 2.
As shown in Figure 3, depending on the standardization cost, there are two
regimes:
High L : For L > (H + L) = () (lower rL (n) schedule in Figure 3), there is a
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Figure 3: Solid = rssH (n), Dashed = rL (n)
unique steady state (BGP) corresponding to the unique crossing point of the
rL (n) and rssH (n) schedules.
Low L : For L < (H + L) = () (upper rL (n) schedule) there are two interior and
a corner steady state. The two interior steady states can be seen in Figure
3. In this case, a corner steady state also exists, since rssH (0) =  < rL (0) =
(H + L) = (L) : Hence, standardization is protable at n = 0.
The reason for the potential multiplicity is a complementarity between investment
decisions by rms. If rms expect n to be high in the BGP, they also anticipate a low
standardization rate, m, and this encourages further innovation. Greater innovation
in turn increases the demand for resources (i.e., the demand for investmentrather
than consumption) and raises the interest rate. A greater interest rate reduces the
value of standardization more than the value of innovation), conrming the expecta-
tion of a low m. In contrast, when a large fraction of the resources of the economy
are devoted to standardization, expected returns from innovation decline and this
limits innovative. Expectation of lower innovation reduces the interest rates, leading
to reverse reasoning i.e., encouraging standardization (more than innovation) and
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conrming the expectation of a high m.17 Note that this complementarity was also
present in the model analyzed in the previous sections. Yet, it did not give rise to
multiplicity because Assumption 2 guarantees that the other candidate steady states
correspond to levels of n below nmin, which was ruled out by Proposition 1 under our
baseline tie-breaking rule.18 Thus, the fact that standardization is protable only if
unskilled labor is strictly cheaper than skilled labor prevents the economy from falling
to low-growth traps where innovation is discouraged by the expectation of a very fast
standardization rate.
We summarize the characterization of the set of steady-state equilibria in the
following proposition (proof in the text).
Proposition 9 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then:
1. If L > (H + L) = () there exists a unique BGP which is interior.
2. If L < (H + L) = () there exist two interior BGP equilibria and a corner
steady state.
It is also noteworthy that the non-monotonic relationship between the gss and
L and the policy analysis derived in the previous sections now apply to the higher
interior BGP. The main novelty, however, is that too low a cost of standardization
may lead to multiple steady states, with the equilibrium determined by self-fullling
expectations, and stagnation.
5 Concluding Remarks
New technologies often di¤use as a result of costly adoption and standardization de-
cisions. Such standardization also creates cheaper ways of producing new products,
for example, substituting cheaper unskilled labor for the more expensive skilled labor
necessary for the production of new complex products. This process endogenously
17To see the role of the interest rate, consider a more general formulation of preferences where 
is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In this case, the Euler equation takes
the form _C=C = (r   ) =. Using this, equation (26) becomes:
rssH (n) =
n
n + 1  n
H
H
+ 

1  n
n + 1  n

:
Note that, as  ! 0 the rssH (n) curve becomes at and the BGP is necessarily unique.
18When Assumption 2 is relaxed, it is possible that the rL (n) and rssH (n) schedules cross twice
over the range n 2 nmin; 1.
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generates competition to original innovators. In this paper, we studied the implica-
tions of this costly process of standardization, emphasizing both its role as an engine
of growth and its potential negative e¤ects on innovation (because of the business
stealinge¤ect that it creates).
Our analysis has delivered a number of new results. First, the tension between
innovation and standardization generates an inverse U-shaped relationship between
competition and growth. Second, while technology di¤usion is potentially benecial,
it can also have destabilizing e¤ects. Standardization can open the door to multiple
equilibria (multiple growth paths). Finally, we characterized the optimal competition
and IPR policy and how it depends on endowments and other parameters, such as the
elasticity of substitution between products. We found that innovation rents should
be protected more when skilled workers are perceived as scarcer, that is, when they
are in short supply and when the elasticity of substitutions between goods is high.
We also showed that these results provide new reasons for linking North-South trade
to intellectual property rights protection.
It is also worth noting that a key feature of our analysis is the potential compe-
tition between standardized products and the original hi-tech products. We believe
that this is a good approximation to a large number of cases in which standardization
takes place by di¤erent rms (and often in the form of slightly di¤erent products).
Nevertheless, the alternative, in which standardization is carried out by the original
innovator, is another relevant benchmark. In our follow-up work, Acemoglu et al.
(2010), we study a model of o¤shoring, where o¤shoring can be viewed as a costly
process of standardization carried out by the original innovator to make goods pro-
ducible in less developed countries with cheaper labor.
Our model yields a number of novel predictions that can be taken to the data. In
particular, it suggests that competition and IPR policy should have an impact on skill
premia. Furthermore, data on product and process innovation might be used to test
the existence of a trade-o¤ between innovation and standardization at the industry
level. These seem interesting directions for future work.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall H =
pHH
HAH
= pHH
HnA
. From (11) it is immediate to see that @H
@n
< 0 if pH  pL,
which is true in equilibrium. To establish the properties of L, note that:
@ (  1) lnL
@n
=
1

 
n
1 n
 +1

 
1
n2

h
 1

1 +
 
n
1 n
 1
 h
 1

+
  2
1  n > 0 if  > 2 
1

1
n
h
 1
 
1 n
n
 1
 + h
 1

:
For   2, lim n!1 @L@n =1. Convexity of L follows immediately because the function
@L
@n
has no critical point.
6.2 Notes on Figures
The benchmark economy used to draw all gures has the following parameter values:
 = 0:02;  = 2; H = 22:7; L = 59:1; H = 1; L = 3
implying in steady state:
g = 0:02; r = 0:02; m = 0:02; n = 0:5;
wH
wL
= 1:5:
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
A BGP must be a rest point of the dynamical system (21)-(22). We rst note that
there cannot be a rest point at the boundaries n = nmin and n = 1 in view of Proposi-
tion 1. Thus any BGP must be interior as dened in Proposition 3, or equivalently, it
must be a zero of the dynamical system (21)-(22). We denote such a zero by (nss; ss),
where nss satises rL (nss) = rssH (n
ss) (see again Proposition 3). We prove the exis-
tence of a unique interior BGP by showing that there is a unique value nss 2  nmin; 1
such that rL (nss) = rssH (n
ss), that there is a unique corresponding value of ss and
that at (nss; ss) the transversality condition is satised.
We prove the rst step by establishing that rssH (n
ss) is a continuous inverse
U-shaped function whereas rL (nss) is a continuous, increasing and convex func-
tion. Moreover rssH
 
nmin

> rL
 
nmin

(which follows immediately from Assump-
tion 2) and limn!1 (rL (nss)  rssH (nss)) = 1: Then, the intermediate value theo-
rem establishes the existence of such a BGP, while the shape of the two func-
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tions implies uniqueness. Let  (x) 
h
x+ x
 
1
x
  1 1 h 1  i 1 1 where   2 and
h  0: Standard algebra establishes that  (x) is a continuous inverse U-shaped con-
cave function, such that limx!0 
0 (x) = 1 and limx!1  0 (x) =  1: Thus,  (x)
has a unique interior maximum in the unit interval. Next, note that rssH (n
ss) =
 (nss)  H= (H) + (1  nss) : Since rssH (nss) is a linear transformation of  (nss) ;
it is also a continuous inverse U-shaped concave function, with a unique interior
maximum in the unit interval. Consider now rL (nss) : Since rL (nss) = L (nss) =L,
Lemma 1 establishes that rL (nss) is increasing and convex, with limnss!1 rL (nss) =1
(implying that limnss!1 (rL (nss)  rssH (nss)) =1).
Next, straightforward algebra immediately implies that, conditional on n = nss;
m = m (nss) and z = z (nss) there exists a unique value  = ss that yields a zero of
the dynamical system (21)-(22). Finally, since in BGP r =  + g > g (from (1) and
Assumptions 1-2), the transversality condition is satised in the unique candidate
BGP.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Recall that dynamic equilibria are given by solutions to dynamical system (21)-(22)
with boundary conditions given by the initial condition n = n0 and the transversality
condition. By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 4, there cannot be
any dynamic equilibrium path where n! nmin and n! 1. Any dynamic equilibrium
must thus either converge to the unique (interior) BGP (nss; ss) or involves cycles.
We will show in this proof that starting from any initial condition n = n0 in the
neighborhood of nss (the BGP), there exists a unique path converging to (nss; ss)
and that there cannot be cycles, thus establishing local saddle-path stability of the
dynamic equilibrium.
Because there are two sources of technical change (innovation and standardiza-
tion), we rst distinguish between three possible types of potential dynamic equilibria
(which may converge to the BGP, (nss; ss)).
CASE 1: VH = H and VL < L () m = 0 and g = (y (n)  ) =H). In
this case, from Proposition 3 the dynamics are governed by the following system of
ordinary di¤erential equations:
_

=
H (n)
H
    y (n)  
H
(38)
_n = (1  n) y (n)  
H
:
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CASE 2: VH < H and VL = L () m = (y (n)  ) = (nL) and g = 0). In this
case, again from Proposition 3 the dynamics are governed by the following system of
ordinary di¤erential equations:
_

=
L (n)
L
   (39)
_n =  

y (n)  
L

:
CASE 3: VH = H and VL = L () m = H (n) =H   L (n) =L and g =
(y (n)  Lmn  ) =H). In this case, the dynamics are governed by the following
system of ordinary di¤erential equations:
_

=
L (n)
L
    y (n)  Lmn  
H
(40)
_n = (1  n) y(n)  
H
 mn

1 + (1  n) L
H

:
In all three cases, the di¤erential equations are dened over the region  2
[0; y (n)]; n 2 [nmin; 1]:
Recall that in the BGP m > 0 and g > 0. This implies that VH = H and
VL = L: Therefore, (n
ss; ss) is a zero of the dynamical system (40), but it is not
a zero either of (38) or of (39). Nevertheless, we will show that CASE 3 cannot
describe dynamic equilibrium behavior at any point with (n; ) 6= (nss; ss). Instead,
the equilibrium will be given by either CASE 1 or CASE 2 (depending on whether
n is above or below nss) and will be unique. Then under the equilibrium dynamics,
the economy will converge in nite time to (nss; ss) ; and then a jump in m and r
will create a switch to CASE 3 at that point, and since (nss; ss) is a zero of (40), the
economy will have reached the BGP and will stay at (nss; ss) thereafter.
We prove by rst establishing several Lemmas. First, Lemma 2 establishes that,
if n < nss; there exists a unique trajectory converging to (nss; ss) (it is immediate
that, if n < nss, there exists no trajectory converging to (nss; ss) following the
dynamics (39), since these would imply _n  0). Second, Lemma 3 establishes that,
if n > nss; there exists a unique trajectory converging to (nss; ss) following the
dynamics (39) (it is immediate that, if n > nss, there exists no trajectory converging
to (nss; ss) following the dynamics given by (38), since these imply _n  0). Third,
Lemma 4 provides a complete characterization of equilibrium dynamics when the
transition involves either only innovation or only standardization, followed by a jump
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in either the innovation of standardization rate as the economy reaches (nss; ss),
but continuous changes in asset values. Fourth, Lemma 5 establishes that (under
the su¢ cient conditions of the Proposition) there exists no trajectory converging
to (nss; ss) following the dynamics (40). Finally, Lemma 6 rules out transitional
dynamics in the neighborhood of the BGP in which there is a jump from CASE 3 to
either CASE 1 or CASE 2 or between CASE 1 and CASE 2. These lemmas together
establish local saddle-path stability.
Lemma 2 Suppose n0 < nss: Then, there exists a unique trajectory attaining (nss; ss)
in nite time following the dynamics of CASE 1, (38). This trajectory features
monotonic convergence in n ( _n > 0).
Proof. Consider the phase diagram depicting the system of di¤erential equa-
tions (38) shown in Figure 4. This system has no zero over the feasible region
[nmin; 1]  [0; y (n)] (i.e., over the region where n 2 [nmin; 1] and  2 [0; y (n)]). In
particular, in the interior of the region [nmin; 1]  [0; y (n)], and hence at (nss; ss),
_n > 0 and _ R 0 ,  R ^ (n) ; where ^ (n) = H + y (n)   H (n) < y (n) : The
last inequality follows from Assumption 1. Although whether ^ (nss) R  (nss) is in
general ambiguous, the phase diagram shows that there is a unique trajectory (and a
unique initial level of the control variable, 0) converging in nite time to (n
ss; ss) :
In particular, since (nss; ss) is not a zero of the system (38), the determination of
the converging trajectory can be expressed as an initial value problem with (nssT ; 
ss
T )
being the boundary (terminal) condition. From the standard result of existence and
uniqueness of solutions for systems of ordinary di¤erential equations, this initial value
problem has a unique solution. Fixing the initial condition n0 yields a unique solution
for T (the length of the transition) and 0. The monotonicity of the dynamics of n
ensures that this solution is unique, i.e., there does not exist two solutions (n0; T; 0)
and (n0; T 0; 00) with T 6= T 0 and 0 6= 00: This argument also proves that convergence
is attained in nite time.
Lemma 3 Suppose n0 > nss: Then, there exists a unique trajectory attaining (nss; ss)
in nite time following the dynamics of CASE 2, (39). This trajectory features
monotonic convergence ( _n < 0 and _ > 0).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2. The dynamical system again has
no zero over the feasible region [nmin; 1] [0; y (n)]. In particular, for n0  nss, _n > 0
and _ > 0: The latter follows from the observation that _ R 0 , L (n) =L R ;
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Figure 4: Saddle Path, n0 < nss
where 0L (n) < 0 and L (n
ss) =L > ; implying that L (n) =L >  for all n  nss.
The phase diagram in Figure 5 shows that there is a unique trajectory converging in
nite time to (nss; ss) : This trajectory features monotonic dynamics.
The previous two Lemmas together imply our key characterization result.
Lemma 4 There exists equilibrium dynamics with the following characteristics.
If n0 < nss; the economy converges in nite time to (nss; ss) following the system
of di¤erential equations (38), with monotonic convergence in n: Throughout this con-
vergence, VH = H ; VL < L; m = 0 and g = (y (n)  ) =H . When the economy
reaches (nss; ss) ; there is a discrete increase in standardization o¤set by a fall in the
interest rate such that r (nss) = r0 (nss)+m (nss) : Thereafter, VH = H and VL = L:
If n0 > nss the economy converges in nite time to (nss; ss) following the system of
di¤erential equations (39), with monotonic convergence in n and : Throughout this
convergence, VH < H ; VL = L; m = (y (n)  ) = (nL) > 0 and g = 0. When
the economy reaches (nss; ss) ; there is a discrete fall in standardization o¤set by an
increase in innovation such that y (nss)    remains constant. Thereafter, VH = H
and VL = L:
Proof. The proof follows from Lemmas 2 and 3 combined with the following obser-
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Figure 5: Saddle Path, n0 > nss
vations. Suppose we start with n0 < nss, then the dynamic equilibrium is given by
the system of di¤erential equations (38), so from Lemma 2 until T , we have m = 0.
At T , we reach (nss; ss) and m jumps from zero to its steady state, mss. This is
o¤set by an equal jump down in r implying that VH does not change (i.e., it remains
at VH = H). Moreover, at T; VL attains its steady state (BGP) value, VL = L:
Note that there is no discontinuity in the asset value VL; since the change in r and
m are perfectly anticipated, causing a continuous change in the value VL before the
actual change occurs to reach VL = L exactly at T (the continuity of VL ensures
that there is no arbitrage opportunity in buying and selling shares of L-sector rms).
Thus at this point, the dynamics switch to those given by the system of di¤erential
equations (40) with both innovation and standardization. Since (nss; ss) is a zero of
(40), the economy stays at (nss; ss) thereafter. The fact that this path satises the
transversality condition follows by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition
4.
Next, suppose that we start with n0 > nss. Then the dynamic equilibrium is given
by the system of di¤erential equations (39) and from Lemma 3, until T , g = 0. At
T , investment in standardization and mT fall discretely (the latter declining to mss),
and investment in innovation and g jumps up (the latter increasing to gss). There is
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no change in overall investment and thus neither r, nor consumption nor VL change
at T . As m jumps down, VH attains its stead state value, VH = H exactly at T (note
that the path of VH is continuous at T; as the change in m is perfectly anticipated
by investors). As a result, again at T , the dynamics switch to those given by the
system of di¤erential equations (40) with both innovation and standardization. Since
(nss; ss) is a zero of (40), the economy stays at (nss; ss) thereafter. The fact that
this path satises the transversality condition again follows by the same argument..
We next show that transitional dynamics converging to (nss; ss) cannot feature
both VH = H and VL = L since the system (40) is unstable in the neighborhood of
(nss; ss) :
Lemma 5 Suppose n0 6= nss: Then, under the (su¢ cient) conditions of the Proposi-
tion, there exists no trajectory converging to (nss; ss) following the dynamical system
(40).
Proof. The proof, which is long, is presented in the next subsection.
Lemmas 2-5 establish that in the neighborhood of (nss; ss) ; we must have either
VH < H or VL < L, implying that there is either only innovation or only standard-
ization. However, the results established so far do not rule out switchesbetween
di¤erent regimes while nt 6= nss, and thus cycles. Moreover, with such switches, the
equilibrium might also be indeterminate, with multiple paths starting from some ini-
tial n0 converging to the BGP. Lemma 6 rules out all of these possibilities by showing
that in the neighborhood of the BGP, there cannot be a switch from the dynamics
given by any one of (38), (39) and (40) to one of the other two. (For notational
convenience, in this lemma, we write VH;t = H to mean that VH;t0 = H for t
0 in a
neighborhood of t).
Lemma 6 Consider an equilibrium trajectory in the neighborhood of the BGP, (nss; ss).
Then, there cannot be a switch from any one of (38), (39) and (40) to one of the other
two, i.e., if at t0 in the neighborhood of (nss; ss), we have VH;t0 = H and VL;t0 = L,
then an equilibrium cannot involve VH;t < H and/or VL;t < L for t > t0; if we have
VH;t0 = H and VL;t0 < L, then an equilibrium cannot involve VH;t < H and/or
VL;t = L for t > t0; and if we have VH;t0 < H and VL;t0 = L, then an equilibrium
cannot involve VH;t = H and/or VL;t < L for t > t0.
Proof. We will prove that if in the neighborhood of (nss; ss), we have VH;t0 = H
and VL;t0 = L, then an equilibrium cannot involve VH;t = H and VL;t < L for
t > t0. The other cases are analogous.
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Suppose to obtain a contradiction that this is the case and denote the last instance
where VL = L by T (i.e., VL;T+" < L for " > 0. We need to distinguish two cases.
First, VL;t0 < L for all t
0 > t, and second, there exists T 0 > t, such that we again
have VL;T 0 = L.
Case 1: the fact that VL;t0 < L for all t
0 > t contradicts the hypothesis that the
equilibrium path will converge to the BGP.
Case 2: we write VL;T as follows:
VL;T =
Z 1
T
exp

 
Z 
T
r(n)d

L (n ) d
=
Z T 0
T
exp

 
Z 
T
r(n)d

L (n ) d + exp
 
 
Z T 0
T
r (n ) d
!
L;
where the equality exploits the fact that by hypothesis VL;T 0 = L. Moreover, we also
have, again by hypothesis, that VL;T = L, which impliesZ T 0
T
exp

 
Z 
T
r(n)d

L (n ) d =
 
1  exp
 
 
Z T 0
T
r (n ) d
!!
L: (41)
Suppose next that nT > nss. By the instability result in Lemma 5, this implies _nT > 0
and thus n > nss for all  2 [T; T 0]. But then from Lemma 1, L(n ) > L(nss) for
all  2 [T; T 0]. Moreover, since VH; = H and VL; < L, we also have that for all
 2 [T; T 0],
r (n ) =
H (n )
H
>
L (n )
L
>
L (n
ss)
L
= r (nss) ;
where the second inequality again follows from Lemma 1 in view of the fact that
n > n
ss for all  2 [T; T 0]. But then,
Z T 0
T
exp

 
Z 
T
r(n)d

L (n ) d <
 Z T 0
T
exp

 
Z 
T
r(n)d

d
!
L (nss)
<
 
1  exp
 
 
Z T 0
T
r(n )d
!!
L;
where the second inequality follows from the fact that r (n ) < r (nss) for all  2
[T; T 0]. This inequality contradicts (41).
Suppose instead that nT < nss. By the instability result in Lemma 5, _nT < 0 and
thus n < nss for all  2 [T; T 0]. Moreover, by the same reasoning for all  2 [T; T 0],
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H(n ) > H(n
ss) and since VL; < L, m (n ) = 0. Therefore,
VH;T =
Z 1
T
exp

 
Z 
T
(r(n) +m(n)) d

H (n ) d
=
Z T 0
T
exp

 
Z s
T
r(n)d

H (n ) d + exp
 
 
Z T 0
T
r(n )d
!
H : (42)
But since for all  2 [T; T 0]
r (n ) =
H (n )
H
>
H (n
ss)
H
the rst term in (42) is strictly greater than

1  exp

  R T
t
r (n ) d

H and thus
contradicts VH;T = H .
Lemmas 2-6 establish the results of the Proposition. In particular, Lemmas 5 and
6 imply that starting at nt 6= nss in the neighborhood of the BGP we must have
VH < H or VL < L. If VH = H and VL = L, either we diverge from the BGP
in view of 5, or we have to switch to a regime where VH < H or VL < L, which is
ruled out by Lemma 6. If we have VH < H or VL < L in the neighborhood of the
BGP, then Lemmas 2-4 imply that there exists a unique path converging to the BGP.
This completes the proof of the Proposition.
6.5 Proof of Lemma 5
We take a linear approximation of the dynamical system (40) around (nss; ss) :
_

' F (ss; nss)  (  ss) + Fn (ss; nss)  (n  nss)
_n
n
' G (ss; nss)  (  ss) +Gn (ss; nss)  (n  nss)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and
F (; n)  r (n)    y (n)  Lm (n)n  
H
;
G (; n) 

1  n
n

y (n)  
H
 m (n)

1 + (1  n) L
H

:
39
implying that:
F (; n) =
1
H
> 0; G (; n) =  

1  nss
nss

1
H
< 0:
Solving for the schedules such that, respectively, _ = 0 and _n = 0 yields:
 (n) j _=0 = y (n)  Lm (n)n  H (r (n)  )
 (n) j _n=0 = y (n)  Lm (n)n  Hm (n)

n
1  n

;
with slopes:
0 (n) j _=0 =  Fn (
ss; nss)
F (ss; nss)
and 0 (n) j _n=0 =  Gn (
ss; nss)
G (ss; nss)
:
Suppose there were trajectories featuring both innovation and standardization
converging to (nss; ss) : Then, either one or both eigenvalues of the linearized system
would be negative. We show that this is impossible and that under the su¢ cient con-
ditions of the Proposition both eigenvalues must be positive. Let the two eigenvalues
of the linearized system be denoted by 1 and 2: We know that
1 + 2 = F (
ss; nss) +Gn (
ss; nss)
1  2 = F (ss; nss) Gn (ss; nss)  Fn (ss; nss) G (ss; nss) :
Claim 1 The following inequality holds
 Fn (
ss; nss)
F (ss; nss)
<  Gn (
ss; nss)
G (ss; nss)
:
Hence, 1  2 > 0
Proof. We need to show that 0 (nss) j _=0 < 0 (nss) j _n=0. Dene  (n) =  (n) j _=0 
 (n) j _n=0 = Hm (n)
 
n
1 n
 H (r (n)  ). We know that m (n) = 0 for n  nmax >
nss: Thus, at n = nmax we have:
 (nmax) =  H (r (n)  ) =  H

H(n)
H
  

< 0
by Assumption 1. Next, recall that at nmin = H
H+L
we have y (n) = H + L, m (n) =
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H+L


1
H
  1
L

and r (n) = H+L
L
. Thus:

 
nmin

= H
H + L


1
H
  1
L

h  H

H + L
L
  

> 0
by Assumption 2. Moreover, we know that nss is unique. Thus,  (nss) j _=0 =
 (nss) j _n=0 for a unique value of nss. Then, by the intermediate value theorem,
 (n) j _=0 >  (n) j _n=0 for all n < nss and  (n) j _=0 <  (n) j _n=0 for all n > nss:
Since we know that 12 > 0, showing that 1+2 > 0 establishes that the system
has two positive eigenvalues and is therefore unstable. The condition 1 +2 > 0 can
be written as:
0 (n) j _n=0 =  Gn (
ss; nss)
G (ss; nss)
>
F (
ss; nss)
G (ss; nss)
=  

n
1  n

1
H
: (43)
A su¢ cient condition for (43) to be satised is that the locus _n = 0 be upward sloping
in a neighborhood of the BGP. Let us rst consider the case where  ! 0. Using
y (n) =  [nH (n) + (1  n)L (n)] and m (n) = H(n)H  
L(n)
L
into  (n)j _n=0:
 (n) j _n=0 = y (n) m (n)

n
1  nH + nL

= [H (n)n]  A (n)
where A (n) 
h
L
H
+ L(n)
H(n)
 
1 + 
n

+ 1
1 n

L(n)
H(n)
H
L
  1
i
. We know that the factor
H (n)n is inverted U-shaped, with a maximum at n > nmin (it corresponds to
the maximum g characterized in Section 2.7). Thus, for n 2 [nmin; n] a su¢ cient
condition for 0 (n)j _n=0 > 0 is
@A(n)
@n
> 0:
@A (n)
@n
=
@
@n

L (n)
H (n)

1 +

n

  L (n)
H (n)

n2
+
1
(1  n)2

L (n)
H (n)
H
L
  1

+
@
@n

L (n)
H (n)

1
1  n
For  ! 0, in the BGP we have L(n)
H(n)
= L
H
n and @
@n

L(n)
H(n)

=  1

L(n)
H(n)
1
(1 n)n =
 1
(1 n)
L
H
. Thus:
@A (n)
@n
=
L
(1  n)H

  1

+   1
n
+
  1
 (1  n) +
H
L

:
A su¢ cient condition for 0 (n) j _n=0 > 0 is then:
  1

+   1
n
+
  1
 (1  n) +
H
L
> 0
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Finally, note that in the BGP L(n)
H(n)
= L
H
n ! H
L
= H(n)
L(n)
n =
 
1 n
n
h
  1
 n. Thus,
the su¢ cient condition become:
  1

+   1
n
+
  1
 (1  n) +

1  n
n
h
  1

n > 0
Since this expression is increasing in n, we only need to verify that it is positive at
nmin. At nmin we have
 
1 n
n
h
  1
 = 1 and the condition becomes:
  1

+   1
n
+
  1
 (1  n) + n > 0: (44)
Substituting nmin = h= (1 + h) yields (28) in the text.
Finally, for n > n, rewrite the necessary condition as:
0 (n) j _n=0
 (n) j _n=0 =
0H (n)
H (n)
+
1
n
+
@A
@n
1
A
>  

n
1  n

1
H (n) j _n=0
From equations (16) and (17):
0H (n)
H (n)
+
1
n
=
1

[y (n)]
1 

  1

H
n
  1

  1

[y (n)]
1 

  1

L
1  n
  1

+
1
n
:
Substituting [y (n)]
 1
 = (1  n) 1 L  1 + n 1H  1 into this expression, we have
  1
 (  1)
(1  n) 1
1 +
 
n
1 n
 1
 h
 1

<
0H (n)
H (n)
+
1
n
This implies that @A(n)
@n
1
A(n)
> 1
( 1)
1
1 n
1+( n1 n)
1
 h
 1

is su¢ cient for 0 (n) j _n=0 > 0: Now
using the fact that in BGP L(n)
H(n)
= L
H
n, we obtain that A (n) = 1   H
L
+ n + .
Thus, a su¢ cient condition for 0 (n) j _n=0 > 0 is:
 1

+   1
n
+  1
(1 n) +
H
L
1  H
L
+ n+ 
>
1
 (  1)
1
1 +
 
n
1 n
 1
 h
 1

(45)
The LHS is increasing in n, the RHS is decreasing. Thus, if this condition is satised
at n, it will also be satised for higher values of n. Since n  1=2 (see (32)), it can
be veried that condition (45) is always satised when (44) holds. In sum, (44) is suf-
cient to prove that the dynamical system with both innovation and standardization
42
is locally unstable in the limit where  ! 0. By continuity, the same result applies
for  <  for some  > 0 su¢ ciently small.
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